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Abstract 
There are key figures in the design and the maintenance of audience ratings that are often 
unknown to the public, but whose careers have been in assessing, evaluating and innovating 
ratings systems. They also tend to be the major figures in the auditing of ratings, of mapping 
changes in the audience with respect to the ratings, and indeed inventing new ratings 
systems. Gale Metzger in the United States, Tony Twyman in the UK, and Ian Muir in 
Australia are each key figures in this regard, but there are many more. In this paper the 
authors provide an historical overview of what we call the ratings intellectual. These 
intellectuals deal with ratings measurement as a form of knowledge and when crises in the 
operation of the ratings emerge they have had the highest profile in their solution.  At the 
same time an important role has been played by more public figures who we can call 
“general ratings intellectuals”. Historically, some independent ratings intellectuals, like Leo 
Bogart, have had a public profile as public commentators on ratings as a form of social 
research alongside ratings entrepreneurs such as AC Nielsen and Hooper in the USA and Bill 
McNair in Australia who published extensively on audience measurement and ratings often 
as a means of educating their clients and selling their services. Leo Bogart provided a 
generation of market researchers with a sense of the utility and scope of ratings as a specific 
and limited form of market research; while entrepreneurs such as Arthur Neilsen and Bill 
McNair introduced and promoted the concept of the ratings to potential clients and the 
broader public in the ratings.  
After the formalisation of auditing functions from the mid-1960s ratings intellectuals 
increasingly became involved in both the ongoing investigation of the carriage of the ratings 
and in seeking improvements to its operations. To do this they often, like Bogart, operated 
outside the ratings companies themselves. Today, though, the ratings intellectual keeps a 
much lower profile as intellectuals exercising specific expertise within a particular technical 
domain even though their importance remains.  Our principal figure here is Gale Metzger. 
The authors consider the operation of both personae as constitutive of the operation of 
modern ratings as a system of thought. It is our contention that the ratings intellectual 
represented a particular office although this office certainly changes over time. In this paper 




Studying the persona 
To describe and do some justice to the knowledge work of these people we are calling them 
ratings intellectuals. That designation helps us recognise the standing of these people as 
thinkers and methodologists dealing with—and thinking with—data and its limitations and 
then communicating these limitations and possibilities to users and clients of the research. 
Bogart and people like him brought their professional expertise to bear as advisors. They 
commonly produced information and data that is not always understood by those who use it 
and act on its behalf. Bogart was a methodologist responsible for innovations in syndicated 
research. He wanted to have discussions about methodology. Bogart was also a sceptic. And 
this sceptical persona was important to the role he played as enlightened critic and 
commentator on marketing, audience, and broader trends in social research.  Individuals 
such as Bogart need to be distinguished from those who use ratings and other forms of 
applied social research to construct a broadcast schedule, to analyse the reach and 
trajectory of a program over a season and seasons, to identify appropriate “slots” for 
broadcast messages and to report on the respective shares of broadcast networks.  
The authors are drawn to the idea of a persona as a means of thinking about this larger 
constellation of contextual issues around people like Bogart who were more than survey 
technicians but were also ratings intellectuals. While there are a variety of ways of thinking 
about persona as a kind of role-playing derived from the work of Erving Goffman and Marcel 
Mauss which centre the triadic relation among inner self, role and society—our interest is in 
the uptake of persona “as a manifestation and representative of an office” (Condren 2006, 
p. 66). Condren, Hunter and Gaukroger writing about the history of early modern philosophy 
argue that in order  “to understand the answers philosophers have given, it is necessary to 
reveal the contingent and variable nature of their problems, even if history here is really the 
medium in which such problems are resolved” (Condren et al., 2006, p. 3). For these writers 
this implied a shift of focus from “philosophical problems to the institutional contexts in 
which they are delimited, and from the subject of consciousness to the persona of the 
philosopher that is cultivated in such contexts” (Condren et al., 2006, p.7) The idea of an 
“office” as in a “public office” provides a way of exploring what in a former time we might 
have called a “speaking position” which in being institutionally sanctioned was important to 
the carriage of the role. For Condren to be representative of an office means to be “an 
embodiment of a moral economy” in the sense that a office entails “a whole sphere of 
responsibilities, rights of action for their fulfilment, necessary attributes, skills and specific 
virtues, highlighted by concomitant vices and failures” (Condren, 2006, p. 66). 
These remarks suggest that we might usefully regard the writing and activism of ratings 
intellectuals on their own behalf and as a profession as being informed by a sense of a 
sphere of responsibility both to the profession, the industry and to a larger public and social 
good. We can look to the kinds of actions that they took and deemed appropriate to take. 
We can look to the specific skills that were important to this exercise and ethical ways of 
acting and thinking that he advocated and practiced. And we can open up an investigation of 
”the vices and failures” of the professions they spoke to—how were these elaborated and 
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denounced. Bogart provides a rich field for such inquiry.  On the last matter alone there is 
Bogart’s high profile denouncing of both the concept of spiral of silence and its proponent 
Noelle Neumann for her Nazi propagandist past as providing one way of thinking about this. 
But such a larger inquiry must wait another time. What we are interested in here is Bogart’s 
specific criticism of the ratings and the institutional contexts in which these criticisms came 
alive.  
Those with a “speaking position” within the industry and in the public arena have been and 
are limited.  Archibald Crossley, the founder of audience ratings, like Bogart, wrote in the 
popular press, academic journals, industry journals and professional committees. C.E. 
Hooper and A.C. Nielsen, likewise, both created the techniques of ratings, critiqued them, 
and participated in policy and public debates.  Crossley’s prodigy, Gale Metzger, did so on an 
even larger scale. Gale Metzger is the retired cofounder and President of Statistical 
Research, Inc.  (SRI). SRI created and provided a number of major media and consumer 
research services, including:  
• the audience ratings for national network radio (RADAR®: Radio ' s All Dimension Audience 
Research 1972-2001);  
• studies and audits o f television measurement systems , including the development - in 
collaboration with major networks and advertisers - of a complete ratings service for the 
digital era (SMART);  
• ongoing services to understand how consumers use media - including TV, radio and the 
internet - in everyday life (MultiMedia Mentor);  
• many sponsored studies related to media usage and advertising, including reactions to 
programming and products and ad campaigns.  
The Market Research Council has inducted Gale into its Hall of Fame and the National 
Association of Broadcasters gave him the Hugh Malcolm Beville award in recognition of his 
distinguished professional career in broadcast audience research.  
In the United Kingdom Tony Twyman had a major role setting up RAJAR (Radio Joint 
Audience Research) as well as being Technical Director of BARB (Broadcasters’ Audience 
Research Board).  He has been a Director of TAM, the holder of the first UK television 
audience research contract. In Australia Bill McNair and George Anderson created their own 
ratings techniques, published in their defence, and took a proactive role in educating the 
market and the public about the utility of ratings for advertising and broadcast strategy 
alike.  Ian Muir continued that work making the transition as Twyman and Metzger had done 
in the UK and the USA from working for ratings companies to auditing ratings and advising 
on the development of ratings contracts. Similar trajectories can be seen in the career of Ian 
Garland who was previously Managing Director of AC Nielsen Media Australia from 1997 
until 2001. He is now the founding employee and managing director of Multiview Analytics 
in Australia. The company was established in 2009 to develop research and analytical 
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services for the benefit of the subscription TV industry (STV) and to serve the broader media 
and marketing community. Garland, like Metzger, is seen at one moment as a competitor in 
the world of the audience ratings business, but at the same time an impartial critic of how 
methodologies are constructed and applied. But not all trajectories towards auditing are via 
this route. Some important ratings intellectuals such as Peter Danaher and Peter Miller have 
career trajectories from working in market research (Danaher) and in ratings companies 
(Peter Miller) but then move into academia and from there act as consultants to the ratings. 
For Miller this has involved running, for AC Nielsen, their major survey of non-respondents. 
In Danaher’s case this has involved acting as survey auditor for the television ratings services 
in New Zealand, Australia and Ireland, and the print readership service in New Zealand. 
 
Table 1 at the end of this paper provides a summary of some of the key people in the ratings 
intellectual role.  It is taken for granted, of course, that key early methodologists, like Hans 
Zeisel and Paul Lazarsfeld very much set the broader methodological context for debate. 
Zeisel, particularly, is an important early figure in ratings auditing as he was responsible for 
the earliest “objective” comparison between competing ratings systems in the 1930s when 
he was commissioned by his advertising agency employer to report on the discrepancies 
between Hooper and CAB results in the 1930s for their clients. What marks this as important 
is the combination of his independence from the companies providing ratings – both Arthur 
Nielsen and Hooper certainly wrote and argued forcefully for their respective systems – and 
the development of methodologies for assessing the mechanisms, procedures and processes 
involved in the ratings. 
 
The general ratings intellectual 
For more than thirty years Leo Bogart’s persona was what we call here a “general ratings 
intellectual”. He was also a trenchant and very public critic of the ratings as a technique of 
audience measurement and how they are used by advertisers, advertising agencies, media 
planners and buyers and the radio and television industries. While many of his criticisms also 
feature in many media studies critiques of the ratings, his standpoint and speaking position 
were very different from the cultural and media studies critique. First and foremost he was 
an industry insider concerned with the proper conduct of social and market research. 
Perhaps because his criticisms were always part of larger industry discussions his sustained 
engagement with the ratings and the telling criticisms he made of its practice and uptake 
have not had the close attention they deserve. Bogart had a wide ranging agenda. He wrote 
about advertising strategy, the uses to be made of and possibilities for social and marketing 
research, the trajectories of the television industry and of commercial culture more 
generally, and developments in social and marketing research to which he contributed in no 
small measure. He was concerned to place the ratings in an ensemble of audience research.  
Bogart’s criticisms mix practical experience and the theoretical knowledge of a 
methodologist and are closely linked to who and what he was as an industry player and a 
5 
 
virtuoso public commentator. Bogart’s insider reproach to the broadcast ratings is one of the 
field’s most sustained and informed criticisms of its shape and trajectory—and is worthy of 
attention as such. Bogart devoted significant sections of a number of his books to a 
discussion of the ratings starting in the 1950s and extending right through to the mid-2000s. 
These criticisms document and criticise the transformation of the ratings and market 
research over the period to become the pre-eminent media research instrument in the US 
and beyond. They cover the period in the US when ratings provision was a contestable 
market and there were a number of different, rival ratings providers. They chart the 
beginning and maturing of auditing regimes for ratings provision out of the Congressional 
hearings beginning in the late 1950s and moving into the 1960s given pre-eminence through 
the quiz scandal. They cover the contemporary moment where ratings sit alongside an 
ensemble of other proprietary syndicated information sources increasingly constituting the 
horizon line of action for media planners and buyers, advertisers and media outlets.  
While his criticisms provide one reason for scholarly attention to Bogart, another is provided 
by the very thing that makes his contributions difficult to assimilate to contemporary 
communication and media studies perspectives—the very public place from which he spoke. 
He was both a public intellectual and critic and an industry insider. As a social and marketing 
research methodologist he was responsible for major innovations in syndicated research. He 
was an important figure in a wide variety of research industry forums including the World 
Association of Public Opinion Research and the American Association of Public Opinion 
Research (AAPOR). He was an AAPOR president, honoured with the association’s highest 
award, and was closely linked with the association over his professional life. He may have 
been a trenchant critic but he contributed in no small measure to the very shape of the 
institutions and research enterprises that he criticised.  
His criticisms therefore form an integral part of the internal intellectual and institutional 
history of the ratings and applied social research. He explicitly used his corporate and 
institutional location to prosecute a case for particular kinds of applied social research and 
particular approaches to this research. He did this in AAPOR meetings, in his publishing of 
books and articles of appeal to both specialist and non-specialist readers alike, and in his 
journal articles in specialist publications. He explicitly used his reputation as one of the 
foremost social and applied commercial research practitioners of his day to prosecute his 
case for the appropriate use, disposition towards and flexible relation to social research. This 
combination of critical and practical attention made for a potent combination of ideas and 
public presentation. His criticisms were made with a combination of great intellect and 
rhetorical power.  This speaking position is an important part of his story and provides his 
criticism of the ratings and ratings provision with its peculiar contextual force. This 
combination of elements suggests that a close attention to the historical persona of Bogart 
as a ratings intellectual, critic, and advocate for applied social research may provide a prism 
through which we can grasp aspects of a broader institutional history, including its 
transformation as an intellectual and professional field over Bogart’s active professional life.  
Bogart is best known today for the work of his later years—Over the Edge (2005), 
Commercial Culture (2000) and Finding Out—Personal Adventures in Social Research (2003). 
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In this work he made very public criticism of the growing importance of media planning and 
buying, he was critical of the consolidation of applied social research into a handful of 
companies, he was appalled by the downsizing of television network’s research divisions and 
their increasing reliance upon syndicated data such as ratings in decision making, he 
abhorred their increasing reliance upon “mechanical” research tools such as people meters 
and retail information derived from scanning technology and associated computing 
programs, and he argued for the baleful influence computers were having on the 
understanding of individual motivation and behaviour.  These trenchant criticisms, when 
combined with his important earlier work on the social impact of television (1958, 1972), 
newspaper readership in the wake of television, opinion polling (1972) and advertising 
strategy (1967, 1986), not only provide us with a useful compendium of critical discussion of 
larger developments over the period but also, and more importantly for our purposes, point 
to larger institutional changes and changes in the kinds of practical knowledge, techniques 
and self-understandings of those practicing, buying and using ratings research. These 
changes and re-alignments—changes which increasingly placed Bogart on the outside of an 
industry in which he had been an insider for so much of his professional life—can be usefully 
put into relief by a dual attention to both his ideas and thinking and to the changing 
industry, institutional and intellectual formations within which this thought was exercised, 
valued and criticised.  
Bogart’s persona of an applied social researcher committed to innovations in social research 
method and practice across a wide variety of research areas is still alive today. But he 
himself recognised that the changes he was observing—larger corporate, institutional and 
research practice changes—were marking different configurations of research information 
and its application, and privileging the exercise of certain kinds of research knowledge over 
others. These new configurations were making the kind of thing he did, the positions he 
spoke from, and the mix of institutional positions from which he spoke less in the 
mainstream than they once had been. It had become increasingly unlikely that his 
successors would have such a command of the territory or ability to exercise such a very 
public persona at the intersection of public debate, mediating the spaces among social 
research, marketing, advertisers, agencies and the like. As he recognised, research and 
researchers had become more specialised and with this specialisation and the growing 
routinisation of the uses to be made of research outputs there was less space for mediating 
these knowledges. Bogart’s successors could and would not command the field in quite the 
same way as he once had. 
By attending to what it means to be a ratings and social research methods intellectual, the 
form and character of the comportments attendant to this role, we are able to investigate 
not simply an evidently extraordinary individual’s career but also the kinds of mix of thought 
and action and self-presentation available to ratings intellectuals as they act and promulgate 
to inform and refine ratings instruments and industry uptake alike. The attention we are 
paying here to Bogart’s persona is part of a larger attention we are paying to the history of 




The loss of the persona? 
One of Bogart’s major criticisms of the ratings was that it implied a loss of standing on the 
part of the applied social research methodologist – the person who could not only create 
audience ratings, understand the limitations of data but also revise other methodologies. In 
this he usefully points to the transformations in the industry.  He was critical of 
consolidation and concentration in the research business. The problem with this 
concentration was the effect he saw it having in the conduct of research and its practice. The 
first consequence—and it is a familiar criticism of market consolidation into companies with 
multifaceted portfolios in a variety of industries—was that firms were now being run by 
people who had not come up through the ranks in the business concerned and instead came 
to the business with different and sometimes incompatible knowledge and practice about 
how things were done and why they were done that way. At worst they were uninterested. 
A relatively small number of firms that practice audience research continuously 
and on a large scale are the principal arbiters of what the American public reads, 
sees and hears. It is no slur on the personal merit of integrity of the people who 
manage these firms to say that in many cases they are almost totally 
uninterested in the content of the data their corporations generate, in the 
methods used to generate them, and in the standards that govern the process, 
except insofar as these may be related to their targeted profit goals. (Bogart, 
2000a, p. 130) 
This did not mean that these managers did not “staff their businesses with professionals 
who do have some concerns for content, methods, and standards, and that these 
researchers must be given some latitude to do what they want” (Bogart, 2000a, p. 131). 
Rather it was a different and subtler point: these managers judge the work of the research 
professionals “by the financial results, rather than by the excellence of what they do or the 
knowledge they generate”. This has the consequence of turning an “essentially a humanistic 
social science” into “an assembly line of repetitive and largely meaningless statistics” 
(Bogart, 2000a, p. 131). The problem lay with how these new corporate arrangements 
focused attention towards the “the wrong kinds of measurements” and “the wrong 
interpretations drawn from them”. They were making it more difficult to “search for 
meaning, for knowledge” but this search and capacity to search was what “distinguishes the 
research analyst from the collector and processor of data”.  
Let’s follow his reasoning: 
That business [research] is increasingly dominated by giant companies. The fifty 
largest account for about half the world’s total expenditures on commercial 
research, and only a handful of these big firms are headed by individuals whose 
careers were spent in professional research practice. (Bogart, 2003, p. 282)  
The first casualty of this move was that “research has become the property of non-
researchers” (Bogart, 2003, p. 283). In particular he worried about the trend to which “the 
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analysis of information, both in business and in politics, continues to be taken out of the 
hands of the researchers.” Researchers were no longer managing research businesses. 
Managers were no longer knowledgeable about and imbued with the sense of purpose and 
identity of their researchers. This is a familiar refrain marking as it does the increasing 
corporatisation and growth of large multinational conglomerates whose managers were 
increasingly “context independent”. A new repertoire of competences and skills using, often 
to different ends, the same vocabulary but in different assemblages of knowledge had 
become important. Bogart had a symbol for this new educational training repertoire—the 
MBA: 
Masters of Business Administration who have taken a course in sales and market 
analysis now consider themselves research experts and ‘crunch’ numbers with 
scant regard for their origins or meaning. Large advertising agencies have 
abolished their research departments in favour of units that do “market 
planning and analysis”. (Bogart, 2003, p. 282)  
For Bogart this trend was systemic. It was evident in both the conduct of the research 
companies as much as in the conduct of the companies using ratings data in media 
companies and media planning and buying criticism. His criticism was that the trend towards 
the MBA and forms of market research had spread a superficial general competence in 
market and survey research but accompanying this there had been a parallel trend away 
from a deeper level of understanding and competence. What was now important was that 
the user knew enough to make sense of pre-prepared datasets increasingly available 
through a variety of different channels. What was lost also was the interest of the principals 
of the companies themselves in applied social research. With this loss came a loss of agency 
on their part.  
He saw the increasing centrality of the ratings as connected to these wider trends and the 
downsizing of research and research functions in organisations. Bogart was critical of 
increasing centrality of the ratings data to media company and advertising agency research 
budgets with a consequent diminishing of their capacity to maintain a comprehensive 
research facility. In Finding Out (2003) he put the situation graphically. In 1979 audience 
ratings made up a little more than a quarter of a TV network’s research budget by 1999 it 
was over half. At the same time this same network reduced the size of their research staff 
and therefore research capability from 118 to 38. As Bogart observed this decline was a 
decline in ”original studies that require diligent and expert analysis rather than a mere 
recording of performance” (2003, p. 281-2).  This same pattern he found evident in 
advertising agencies: 
Young and Rubicam, a leading advertising agency, had 250 researchers in a total 
staff of about 1,200 in its head office in 1976. In 2002, Y&R was part of the WPP 
conglomerate, and had 24 “planners” in its New York headquarters. (Bogart, 
2003, p. 281)  
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Both quantitative and qualitative research alike in the service of the (commercially oriented) 
media industry had diminished ”the human contact of the researcher with unique 
individuals” (Bogart, 2003, p. 284 ). If the ratings risked diminishing a sense of the 
fundamental diversity upon which regularities or whatever kind were constructed (that is it 
lost sight of individuals and respect for them); qualitative research risked being diminished 
by the reliance upon and misuse of focus groups. Both problems were tied up in what was 
seen as the loss of a certain kind of professionalism and (relative) autonomy of research and 
research enterprise under the contemporary corporation. Another related concern of 
Bogart’s was a contraction in the institutional fields within which research was able to be 
conducted. Alongside this narrowing of commercial research to fewer instruments used 
more intensively and conducted more regularly, Bogart was concerned about trends within 
the academy that had made it more specialised and insular. Both were disrupting the 
conditions under which the profession of applied social research was conducted, social 
research methods were able to be developed, and the training and induction of researchers 
was accomplished. The previously close connection with research training and research 
concept development in academia was being transformed. He claimed that research 
becoming “the property of non-researchers” widened “the gap between academic and 
applied research” (Bogart, 2003, p. 283).  It meant that “commercial researchers and their 
interests are no longer well represented in professional journals and conferences that once 
engaged them in fruitful dialogue with university scholars”.  While never working in a 
University himself he valued these connections and saw them as intrinsic to his identity and 
performance as a researcher. He looked forward to the ferment of ideas in both social 
research and applied social research.  
For Bogart this meant that media research was becoming more and not less bounded. More 
particular, more routinised, more insular with baleful effects for researchers in both the 
media industries and academia. This was not just the fault of corporate orientations towards 
research as research in academia had in its turn become more ”specialised” and so less in 
contact than before.  Bogart’s ratings criticisms were part of a large and generous 
apprehending of the research and application of research fields. He was clear minded about 
the limitations of much research including commercial research which turns out to be mostly 
inconsequential. Writing about opinion polls in 1972 he could opine that “most survey 
research is devoted to the study of trivia; it is the study or minor preferences in the 
marketplace and in the media” (Bogart, 1972, p. 197). He went on to say that “to a very 
large extent it is not a study of opinion at all but of purchasing and product usage”. This clear 
minded view of a field with which he was so closely connected bears some comparison with 
the larger orientation towards and attitude to research embodied in the career and 
trajectory of Paul Lazarsfeld and his collaborators. For Lazarsfeld the social research 
methodology was what was important and developing concepts for such research and 
getting someone to pay for it—it was not the actual research being undertaken that was as 
important as the prototype testing, the proof of concept being undertaken. Bogart shared 
this outlook. He certainly saw applied social research as a means of developing social 
research instruments which could become a means of solving and illuminating problems on 
a wider scale and canvas than mapping consumer decisions and preferences. He clearly 
believed that much of what was done in the space of marketing research was both narrow 
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and limited and on a broader scale and in the broader social context might not amount to 
much.  
As a commercial researcher he was aware of the differences between himself and his 
academic counterparts. In the 1972 edition of The Age of Television: A study of Viewing 
Habits and Impact of Television on American Life, he put the difference as follows:  
The commercial researcher commonly deals with generous quantities of data but 
rarely has the time to explore them in depth. By contrast, the academic or university 
researcher usually has only limited resources and handles them more intensively. 
(Bogart, 1972, p. 332) 
For Bogart what set ratings services apart from the run-of-the-mill commercial research was 
that this commercial research was:  
oriented to immediate and specific problems. Ordinarily the researcher cannot 
permit himself the luxury of theorizing or looking for generalizations. He must stick 
to the task in hand and come up with a fast and workable solution to the problem 
his client puts before him. Each research project tends to be undertaken from 
scratch, and there is therefore a certain amount of duplication with similar research 
undertaken at other places and times for other clients. Wariness of competitors 
means that research findings are usually kept confidential. (Bogart, 1972, p. 332)  
His writings also represent a particular ethics of and projection of the business of research 
and evidence a care to provide and illuminate what he regarded as the proper place of 
research and a proper and considered perspective on this research. This in its turn would 
generate an appropriate set of expectations to have towards it. These considerations 
informed his understanding and criticism of the ratings. Bogart was concerned for how 
applied social research such as the ratings were to be taken up. He prosecuted these 
concerns internally as much as externally. His books—often published by business presses—
were public communication to be sure but it could be said that he went public in order to 
reach the bits of the ensemble of users and practitioners he could not otherwise reach. His 
work was shaped in the cut and thrust of the debate over research at AAPOR annual 
conferences and more local events, and it was forged and refined in that institution’s 
“contest of ideas”. Bogart criticised the ratings with a broad sweep of social research in 
mind—whether applied in the pursuit of commercial ends or applied in the sense of social 
and governmental ends.  Bogart, of course, did both. There was his work on the 
desegregation of the American Army and his development in the 1960s of a replacement 
newspaper circulation instrument. As Bogart recalls in his testimonial interview for AAPOR in 
the 1950s through to the 1970s at least AAPOR meetings being smaller would have everyone 
listening to and discussing each other’s methodology. Later it became bigger and there 
became less room for participants to consider alternative and new developments.  
Bogart’s reproach to the ratings was, in a significant sense, a concern at the loss of office, of 
the standing and integrity of the applied social research intellectual. It was fundamentally a 
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concern about the loss of a persona that went with it. This loss of room to move was tied 
into the narrowing of larger attentions to the research enterprise, its conduct, and its proper 
integrity. It is not therefore surprising that his criticism of the ratings was accompanied by a 
parallel attention to what he perceived to be similar kinds of systematic misuses of 
qualitative research.  Over Bogart’s career the ratings solidified into a narrow form as a pre-
eminent data source used by media planners and buyers, ad agencies and their clients, and 
media companies. While it had enjoyed relative stability for almost half a century as an 
important data source—right at the end of Bogart’s active and long career it had started to 
solidify into its contemporary form as an even more important data source. With the 
changes in the buying and selling of advertising time and with the concomitant rise of media 
planners and buyers as crucial intermediaries when coupled with the increasingly 
internalised debates about shape and trajectory of ratings, there were different priorities 
vying for recognition. Its rise to increasing pre-eminence was due, as we have seen, to a 
combination of computing power and a move towards the certification of processes of audit 
from the 1960s. And the contest to regard ratings as simply one among a number of 
instruments was resolved in favour of the ratings so opening the way for the “survey” 
methodologist intellectual to be superseded by a recognisably modern ratings intellectual. 
This figure was still a methodologist but not a methodologist relating to a range of social 
research instruments. The ratings intellectual had become more a specific methodologist of 
ratings.  
What kind of appeal to “insiders” was this trenchant criticism? Unlike some of the academic 
media researchers who followed Bogart, Bogart’s criticisms were not the 1980s criticism of 
“positivism” that characterised some British sociology debates leading notably to Catherine 
Marsh’s (1982) defence of the survey as a social research tool. Neither was it a criticism of 
the general deployment of numbers. Anyone who has read Bogart’s study of the press and 
its public (1989) could not see Bogart in this light. His scepticism was not of a general kind 
related to the survey form and general deployment of numbers. It was a scepticism borne 
within numbers. Bogart’s criticism of the ratings was part of a broader critique. As we have 
observed this was not a critique of research in the service of advertising decisions but rather 
a critique that given that research “provides the basic rationale for advertising decisions” 
this research and the forms it took including but not limited to the ratings was “commonly 
used in disregard of its limitations, which deserve close scrutiny” (Bogart, 2000a, p. 122). 
The disputes Bogart entered into become disputes over what is to count as applied social 
research and what it is to be an applied social researcher. We could see these as “protracted 
border conflict” over the scope of the field and the duties of researchers (Condren et 
al.,2006, p. 8) which Bogart ultimately lost. These disputes and arguments are best 
understood as “formed by the moral habitus of overlapping institutional environments” 
(Condren et al., 2006, p. 8). Bogart saw himself fundamentally as a social researcher working 
in the commercial field. He was not, as increasingly became the case, a specific researcher 
working in a component of marketing and survey research. In a way that is increasingly 
difficult for later research and researchers Bogart was eclectic—with this eclecticism being 
fundamental to and in the mainstream of a particular way of being in and of the world. Even 
at the time it might not have been the dominant mode. Arthur C. Nielsen and his Australian 
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counterpart Bill McNair were also public figures who wrote important books. But their public 
commentary was always related closely to their particular corporate ends of informing their 
clients, vanquishing their rivals, and pursuing their own particular methodological interests. 
While there is some breadth to their work indicating the extent to which they also operated 
in this sphere they were entrepreneurial businessmen with particular products to sell and 
using the knowledge-based attributes, techniques and the like to sell these. Bogart’s persona 
was not the dominant mode of the ratings intellectual even in his time. But he does usefully 
join the dots to complete a circle of a project which we might call modernising social 
research through the survey form and other instruments.  
Bogart’s was a persona where it was the responsibility of those writing as well as reading to 
explore and incorporate all the evidence. Sometimes this came at the expense of rigorous 
and close argumentation. This suggested Bogart was a kind of complementary persona 
defined by his eclecticism and a necessary doctrinal diversity to his contemporaries.  He 
joined up the dots whereas his colleagues—specific ratings intellectuals like Hugh M. Beville 
and Gale Metzger—were more ratings centric in their focus. Beville’s history of the ratings 
extends no further than the ratings instruments themselves with no larger story of 
connections to social research, there are no intimations of a Lazarsfeld or the ratings as part 
of the emergence of applied social research. It is against the background of Bogart we can 
understand the image of the singular and systematic ratings persona of a Metzger or 
Twyman.  
 
The specific ratings intellectual 
With the ratings becoming so central to the market research effort, and single ratings 
providers becoming the norm, a different type of ratings intellectual emerges and was 
required. No longer were there competing ratings instruments to stimulate reflection on 
different approaches. Rather there was increasingly a single figure that had to be assured 
was working correctly. For this system to work, however, intellectuals with particular 
methodological skills would be critical. These were not, however, the skills of the general 
methodologist rather they were the specific methodological skills applied to the ratings as a 
form of knowledge. These specific ratings intellectuals accepted the ratings as a pre-eminent 
research instrument and were intent on continuing this pre-eminence. Indeed the 
circumstances Bogart was criticising are capable of a different construction. The ratings 
intellectual is less of a public than a specific intellectual providing specialised expertise.  
What we find in Bogart is something different and more than what comes later. His books on 
advertising strategy, for instance, look very different from the “blockbuster” textbook of 
today with their class exercises, further reading lists, story and text panels, colour charts, 
educational design and injunctions to be careful about conducting your own research in lieu 
of using proprietorial datasets. Such books present the reader with a “reading competence” 
in the available syndicated proprietorial datasets,  including the ratings that an agency or 
media planner and buyer subscribes to. They treat the field as settled rather than 
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permanently unfinished business and they typically provide delimited and evident rules and 
procedures for going along, acting within and working through ratings and other syndicated 
data. By contrast Bogart’s work encapsulates an orientation towards the material and 
business of advertising strategy as part of the unfinished project of applied social research. 
Bogart’s explorations by contrast are a primer for a different time. It was about orienting the 
reader. It was about the exercise of techniques of criticism and judgement. It emphasised 
the need for judgement and scepticism—not so much a recipe book for utilitarian and 
agreed upon actions on available and routinised datasets as his contemporary college text 
book counterparts but a thoroughgoing appraisal of a field of inquiry and a call for more not 
less customised research and less not more syndicated research and which restores the 
close connection between the researcher and the researched and the users of research. 
Unlike its contemporary counterparts it was not telling people not to do their own 
customised research as the textbooks were wont to do. It did not leave the reader with the 
view as does much of the literature that it was better for all their faults to deal with what 
you know rather than embark upon the unknown and do your own research. 
The general ratings intellectual provided an essential bridge between the black box of 
audience ratings and the public, between the methodology underpinning the ratings and the 
disciplines that use them.  The loss of this persona is not only the loss of a “voice” but of a 
whole approach where audience ratings are continually contested.  Napoli’s (2011, p. 171) 
answer is that audience ratings is going through a period of reinvention and evolution.  At 
the same time Napoli concludes that “one cannot help wonder whether it might be possible 
to bridge the substantial disconnect between’ different academic audience researchers and 
their industry counterparts” (2011, p. 172). 
The authors’ position is clear.  The general ratings intellectual is essential to a critical 
understanding of audience ratings and to their development.  They are not a mere ”add on” 




Table 1: Ratings intellectuals in the early audience ratings history 
 United States Australia United Kingdom 
1930s Archibald Crossley Cooperative Analysis 
of Broadcasting (CAB) owned by 
advertisers and ratings available to 
broadcasters in 1936 
Same day telephone recall measured 
national network programs, changing to 
telephone coincidental in 1940s 
 Robert Silvey head of BBC audience 
research 1936-1960. No audience ratings 
research. 
 1934 C.E. Hooper and Montgomery Clark, 
started with magazine publisher support 
and then  independent radio ratings. 
Hooper bought out CAB after the war. 
Telephone coincidental 
  
1940s  Bill McNair 
Independent radio ratings 
Personal interview 
1946 Reopening of BBC TV, TV questions 
added to 24 hour aided recall to measure 
radio audiences, ABC-TV 
  George Anderson  
Independent radio ratings 
Diary 
 
  1941 Sydney Roslow The Pulse of New 
York Interviews—roster recall measured 




Arthur C. Nielsen Audimeter 
Launched "radio index" in 1942 Acquired 
Hooper's national business in 1950 
Ended radio measurement in 1964 to 
focus on TV 
  
 James Seiler Diary First survey in 1949   
1950s 1949 James Seiler, American Research 
Bureau, later Arbitron. Merged with Tele-
Que in 1951 and took over Hooper's local 
business in 1955 Left TV in 1993 to focus 
on local radio. Tom Birch, Birch Radio, 
telephone recall, provided competitive 
service to Arbitron until 1992 
 1952 BBC begins continuous TV 
measurement, 1955 Nielsen operating NTI 
using audimeters and audilog diaries, TAM 
report on panel of 100 homes using 
Tammeters and Tamlogs, Pulse, using 
aided recall 
1957 TV Audience Advisory Committee 
(TARAC) created 
1957 National Readership survey gegan 
reporting ITV viewing data 




1958 London Viewing Surveys 1 and 2 
(Pulse) 
1959 Nielsen Television Index ceased, TAM 
jointly owned by Nielsen-Attwood 
companies 
 1960s    1960 Investigation into TAM technique, 
Professor M.G. Kendal for TARAC. 
1961 Joint Industry Committee for 
Television Advertising Research (JICTAR) 
formed, owned by Independent Television 
Companies Association (ITCA), the 
Incorporated Society of British Advertisers 
(ISBA) and Institute of Practitioners in 
Advertising (IPA). 1964 TAM awarded 
JICTAR contract for further 3 years. 1968 
JICTAR transfers contract to Audits of Great 
Britain (AGB). JICTAR replaced TARAC 
1962-1964 JICTAR seven day aided recall 
studies used ¼ hour records to produce 
data on more demographic groups than 
meter diary 
1962 Television in a Family Setting study 
1963 A Study of Housewives who are Light 
ITV viewers by TAM 
1964 An investigation in Audience 
Measurement Techniques, ASKE Research 
for JICTAR 
October 1966 Tony Twyman appointed 
technical adviser to JICTAR 
1967 Ehrenberg & Twyman Measuring 
Television Audiences published in Journal 
of the Royal Statistical Society 
Television in Family Setting Attention 
Research (JWT 
 1969 Gale Metzger and Gerald Glasser, 
Statistical Research Inc (SRI) create 
RADAR 
Telephone recall for network radio 
listening and meter for SMART for 
wireless recording of program viewing  
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